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Introduction
Specializing the judiciary is a contentious topic in an American legal
system that assumes generalist judges can handle any case that comes
before them. However, it has been acknowledged that patent law
requires some form of specialization, whether it is among lawyers who
prosecute patents before the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) or
the judges on the appellate court that reviews patent cases. Congress
also recently passed a law that went even further to build patent law
expertise in the judiciary, creating the Patent Pilot Program to allow
participating district courts to designate specific judges to hear patent
cases in that district.1
But, while this is an admirable experiment to promote
specialization for patent litigation at the trial court level, the Patent
Pilot Program may have been misguided in the way it addressed the
problems identified in patent law jurisprudence. As the program is now
seven years into its ten-year duration,2 and the midpoint report on the

1.

Patent Cases Pilot Program, Pub. L. No. 111–349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011).

2.

Id.
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program has been issued by the Federal Judicial Center,3 this Note aims
to look at whether the program is achieving its goals of creating expert
judges for patent cases4 or whether at the end of its duration Congress
should consider other means of patent reform.
Part I of this Note will review studies that occurred prior to the
passage of the Patent Pilot Program to evaluate what was already
known about both patent litigation in district courts and district courts’
relationship with the Federal Circuit. Part I will then go on to review
the information from the five-year report and discuss qualities unique
to patent law that lack data. Finally, Part I will address the passage
and implementation of the American Invents Act (AIA)5 that occurred
after the Patent Pilot Program began. Part II will look at the arguments
for and against specialization before reviewing several suggestions of
how to specialize trial courts for patent litigation. Part III of this Note
will address what should be prioritized in patent litigation reform and
then lay out recommendations concerning the Patent Pilot Program
and how to reform district court litigation of patent cases going forward.

I. Specialization at the Trial Court Level
In 2011, Congress enacted the Patent Pilot Program, which adjusts
how patent cases are transferred between judges in federal district
courts.6 Thirteen districts volunteered; in these districts, at least one
designated judge can have any patent case originally assigned to
another judge in that district voluntarily reassigned to a designated
judge.7 This pilot program will last for ten years, with regular reports
published comparing the empirical differences between patent cases
handled by designated judges and nondesignated judges.8 The reports
evaluate the effect of judicial designation by looking at the extent to
which the program has succeeded in developing expertise in patent
cases among the designated district court judges; the extent to which
3.

Margaret S. Williams et al., Fed. Judicial Ctr., Patent Pilot
Program: Five-Year Report (2016).

4.

124 Stat. at 3674.

5.

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011).

6.

124 Stat. at 3674.

7.

Williams, supra note 3, at 1 & n.2. Voluntary reassignment means that
a nondesignated judge who the case was originally assigned to can choose
to decline that case, after which the case is randomly reassigned to a
designated judge. 124 Stat. at 3674. A nondesignated judge can also
choose to keep the case. Williams, supra note 3, at 1 n.3.

8.

124 Stat. at 3675–76. The Federal Judicial Center put out its first report
in 2016 with data from the first five years of the program. Williams,
supra note 3.
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the program improved the efficiency of the courts involved due to that
expertise; the difference between designated judges and nondesignated
judges in terms of the rate of reversal by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit on the issues of claim construction and substantive law;
the difference between designated judges and nondesignated judges in
terms of the period of time elapsed from the date a case is filed to the
date a trial begins or summary judgment is entered; evidence of forum
shopping; and an assessment of whether Congress should either extend
or make the program permanent.9
While there was general support for this program and some
evidence supporting its setup,10 there was reason to believe that just
building experience among generalist judges was not the solution to
certain stated goals of the program, like reducing claim construction
reversal rates.
A.

What We Knew

The concept of building up district court judges’ patent expertise
by increasing experience to improve patent litigation is not without
analogs. The International Trade Commission (ITC) is an independent,
quasijudicial federal agency that adjudicates cases involving imported
products that allegedly infringe intellectual property rights.11 Because
that adjudication is a large part of the ITC administrative law judges’
(ALJs) dockets, ALJs are considered patent law experts due to their
experience.12 Prior to the implementation of the Patent Pilot Program,
9.

124 Stat. at 3675–76.

10.

See Adam Shartzer, Patent Litigation 101: Empirical Support for the
Patent Pilot Program’s Solution to Increase Judicial Experience in Patent
Law, 18 Fed. Cir. B.J. 191 (2009); Nancy Olson, Does Practice Make
Perfect? An Examination of Congress’s Proposed District Court Patent
Pilot Program, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 745 (2008).

11.

About the USITC, INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/press_
room/about_usitc.htm [https://perma.cc/DT7Y-M92A] (last visited Jan.
18, 2018).

12.

David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts
and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699,
1702 (2009). It appears that fewer ALJs have technical backgrounds than
when this study was done. Holly Lance reports two ALJs had technical
backgrounds. Holly Lance, Not So Technical: An Analysis of Federal
Circuit Patent Decisions Appealed from the ITC, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 243, 260–61 (2010). Currently, it appears that only one
ALJ has a STEM degree. See Administrative Law Judge Photos, INT’L
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/bios/alj_photos.htm
[https://perma.cc/7E8S-53Q3] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). Lance also
reports lower reversal rates for the ITC, with the Federal Circuit reversing
claim construction at a rate of 26.2 percent. Lance, supra, at 266. She
speculates the difference in reversal rates between her and Schwartz’s
studies is due to either a difference in study parameters, where she looked
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data was available indicating that building expertise through exposure
would not correct certain identified issues in patent litigation—
specifically, the rate at which claim construction is overturned by the
Federal Circuit.13
David L. Schwartz cautioned against holding an optimistic view of
what problems the Patent Pilot Program would solve.14 He found that
claim construction rulings by ALJs were not overturned at a lower rate
than those by generalist district court judges.15 The district courts with
the five busiest patent dockets at the time of his study16 had an average
claim construction reversal rate of 30.7 percent, while the ITC’s reversal
rate on claim construction was 31.0 percent.17 He also looked at whether
individual ALJs were overturned less often if they had accrued more
experience and found that ALJs with ten or more claim construction
cases did have a lower reversal rate than compared to the ITC’s average
overall.18 However, Schwartz noted that while these numbers are
relevant when considering how to fix the patent litigation system, the
small number of cases—only twenty-nine—that were appealed from the
ITC with claim construction issues limits the robustness of his
findings.19
at whether each individual issue was reversed and Schwartz focused on
the ultimate ruling of a case, or that different time periods were studied.
Id.
13.

Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1699.

14.

Id. at 1733–34.

15.

Id.

16.

The five busiest included the Northern District of California, Central
District of California, Northern District of Illinois, District of Delaware,
and Southern District of New York. Id. at 1713 & tbl.1. Interestingly, the
Eastern District of Texas did not make the top five for this time frame.
See infra note 40 and accompanying text. Four of those five are also now
designated districts in the Patent Pilot Program, the fifth being the
District of Delaware. Williams, supra note 3, at 3 tbl.1. Schwartz looked
at the aggregate number of patent cases of a court’s docket from the years
1996–2008. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1711.

17.

Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1716.

18.

Id. at 1716–18. Their reversal rate was 27.3 percent. Id. at 1717–18.

19.

Id. at 1712, 1716. ALJs construed claims in more instances, but these were
not appealed, mostly due to settlement. Id. at 1718. This is one issue with
basing an analysis only on the cases appealed. Id. There are other
differences that render district courts and the ITC imperfect analogs—the
ITC is only a quasijudicial body and its investigations are technically
administrative proceedings. However, the substantive law is basically the
same as in district courts, and there is no difference in the law of claim
construction, which the Federal Circuit reviews de novo. Id. at 1710. And,
while litigation before the ITC uses its own rules, these generally parallel
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. One of the biggest differences
between the tribunals is the actual appeals process to the Federal Circuit:
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There was indirect, contradictory evidence from a study done by
Adam Shartzer that found a difference in reversal rates in cases
appealed from district court judges with more experience in patent
law.20 The study compared the reversal rates of the fifteen district court
judges across the country who had heard the most patent cases to the
average reversal rate of the district courts in the top 15 percent of
districts that hear patent cases.21 This study took a broader approach
and looked to measure overall reversal rates—not just reversals on claim
construction.22 As the Patent Pilot Program’s goal was to address not
only claim construction reversal rates but an assortment of identified
problems, Shartzer noted that a better metric was whether increased
experience interacting with the Federal Circuit increased expertise.23 He
tested this by evaluating if judges who had more cases appealed to the
Federal Circuit had higher affirmance rates.24 Results showed that the
judges in districts with the top 15 percent of the patent docket were
reversed at a rate of 11.53 percent, while all district court judges across
the country were reversed at a rate of 15.07 percent.25 More compelling
to the conclusion that more experience interacting with the Federal
Circuit increases expertise was the finding that the fifteen judges who
sat for the most cases appealed to the Federal Circuit were reversed in
an average of only 4.51 percent of cases.26
appeals from district courts proceed directly to the Federal Circuit, but
an appeal at the ITC proceeds from an ALJ’s initial determination to a
petition to the Commission and, if a violation is found, can then be
reviewed by the President before the case is appealed to the Federal
Circuit. Id. at 1710–11. The Commission is a political institution that has
the option to review initial determinations—including claim construction.
Id. at 1711. The Commission considers the American public interest when
reviewing the appropriateness of a remedy for an investigation. Id. After
the Commission’s review, the President has sixty days to intervene, and
it is only after the end of the presidential review period that the Federal
Circuit can hear an appeal. Id. Interesting to note, this study also looked
at reversal rates for claim construction reviewed and altered by the
Commission, versus the reversal rate where the Commission did not alter
claim construction: the reversal rate for altered claim construction was
40.0 percent compared to 26.3 percent for reviewed but unaltered claim
construction. Id. at 1719.
20.

Shartzer, supra note 10, at 219.

21.

Id. at 234–35. The top 15 percent of jurisdictions were the only
jurisdictions that qualified for the proposed patent program at the time
of the study. Id. at 219.

22.

Id. at 227, 233 n.328.

23.

Id. at 227.

24.

Id. at 231.

25.

Id. at 233.

26.

Id. at 235.
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The influence of these two studies depends on the different goals
identified by each author. How the data produced from the Patent Pilot
Program is framed also depends on this question, as does the utility of
the program in general. If the main goal for evaluation is lowering claim
construction reversal rates, then data collected prior to the pilot
program foreshadows whether the program will be considered a success:
studies indicated that when it comes to claim construction, there was
not strong evidence that having judges sit on more cases would have
an appreciable impact.27 Schwartz himself lists a few different
possibilities for this, none of which were addressed by the Patent Pilot
Program.28 However, claim construction reversal rates alone may just
be a bad metric.29 The Patent Pilot Program sets out several goals to
evaluate, which are lost in the concentration on claim construction.30 It
is the other purposes—evaluating expertise on other substantive issues
of patent law, increasing efficiency of litigation, and gauging
specialization’s effect on forum shopping—that should be kept at the
forefront when evaluating the data collected in the first five years of
the Patent Pilot Program.
B.

What We Know

The five-year report mandated by Congress was issued in April
2016.31 It evaluated several features of the program: judge participation
in the pilot program by district; designated and nondesignated judges’
experience with patent litigation; filings and terminations in each of the
thirteen pilot districts, including method of termination and how long
cases stay open before terminating; the effect of staying cases for
proceedings in other tribunals; the prevalence of Markman hearings and
appointments of third-party experts; the frequency with which
summary judgment is entered; appeals of patent cases from pilot courts;
and the choice of venue for patent filings relative to civil filings as a
whole.32
27.

Schwartz, supra note 12.

28.

Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1731–32. Those possibilities included that
judges without technical backgrounds cannot do claim construction, the
Federal Circuit is wrong, or claim construction is indeterminate. Id.

29.

Shartzer, supra note 10, at 218; Etan S. Chatlynne, On Measuring the
Expertise of Patent-Pilot Judges: Encouraging Enhancement of ClaimConstruction Uniformity, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 321
(2013).

30.

Shartzer, supra note 10, at 217–20. Olson, supra note 10, at 762.

31.

Williams, supra note 3. In patent litigation, Markman hearings are
hearings that usually occur prior to trial where patent claims are
construed. Id. at 23.

32.

Id. at 1–2. The study also looked at the effects of case inclusion in
multidistrict litigation (MDL) but found that the number of reported
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The data the Federal Judicial Center used in its analysis included
thirteen district courts participating in the Patent Pilot Program with
a total of sixty-six designated judges.33 As the goals of the program are
tied to the idea that experience increases expertise among designated
judges, the report begins with an evaluation of the amount of experience
the designated judges had handling patent litigation prior to the
program.34 The report broke down the differing levels of experience
among all judges in the thirteen designated districts prior to the start
of the program and found a wide range: most judges had handled from
0–50 patent cases, but some judges had seen 351–1,175 filed cases and
351–861 terminated cases.35 The same pattern has held five years into
the program: at the higher end of the spectrum, a few judges have
increased the number of cases over which they have presided to 351–
4,506 filed cases and 351–3,206 terminated cases, but most still have
only seen fifty total cases.36
At the start of the program, there was a statistically significant
difference between the amount of experience designated and
nondesignated judges had in both filed and terminated patent cases;
after five years, there is still a statistically significant difference in filed
cases.37 However, while this shows a trend in the data, experience among
individual designated judges and across the districts varies due to
factors like the percentage of the judges designated in each district, the
amount of experience each judge had prior to the program, and the
number of cases filed in each district.38 For example, the Eastern
District of Texas has the most patent cases filed, and 98 percent of
those cases are heard by designated judges; on the other hand, the
Central District of California has the second highest number of patent

cases involved in MDLs in the designated districts was too small to
analyze. Id. at 16. The study also looked at the frequency with which
companies file multiple lawsuits in the same district on the same day or
sequentially to evaluate the filing activity of nonpracticing entities—i.e.,
patent trolls. Id. at 2. For results, see id. at 30 tbl.26, 31 tbls.27 & 28.
33.

Id. at 2. The report analyzed data available as of January 5, 2016 and
included all patent cases filed on or after the individual start date of the
pilot program established by each designated district court. Id.

34.

Id. at 3.

35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 4.

37.

Id. at 5.

38.

Id. at 6.
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cases filed at 1,592, but only 49 percent of those cases are heard by
designated judges.39
Across all districts, there were 3,878 transferred patent cases since
the start of the program and 72 percent were transferred for purposes
of the Patent Pilot Program.40 This indicates that the program is
working to increase the experience of certain judges by increasing the
amount of patent cases they see, though at varying rates among
individuals and across districts.41
Another stated benefit from increased judicial experience is
efficiency in handling cases, and the study reports that there is a
statistically significant difference between the number of days a
designated and a nondesignated judge has a case on their docket from
filing to termination.42 Where there is an average of 287 days between
filing and termination for nondesignated judges, designated judges
average only 257 days.43 Because the Patent Pilot Program’s method of
increasing judicial experience is through a procedural measure that
allows judges to take on extra patent cases by having them transferred
from other judges, which can take up to thirty days, the study also
measured duration by pilot status, number of transfers, and a judge’s
number of terminations to account for patent experience.44 The study
found that pilot cases were terminated 8 percent faster, further
evidencing that pilot cases are completed faster than nonpilot cases.45
39.

Id. at 9 tbl.3. That is not the lowest percentage—in the Northern District
of California only 23 percent of filed patent cases are heard by designated
pilot judges. Id.

40.

Id. at 10. There were 2,776 total transferred cases. The purpose was
determined to be for the pilot program because the cases were transferred
to a designated judge within the transfer window established by the
district. Id.

41.

Id. at 38.

42.

Id. at 22. The study also separated pending and terminated cases and
looked at how many terminations each district had, the average
percentage of terminations in both pilot and nonpilot cases, the different
methods of termination, and the percentage of stays in pilot and nonpilot
cases. Id. at 12–21.

43.

Id. at 22 tbl.16.

44.

Id. at 22–23.

45.

Id. at 23. Special features of the patent system were taken into account
when considering the duration of cases, including stays for proceedings at
the ITC and PTO, id. at 17–18, 20–21, holding Markman hearings, id. at
23–25, and the appointment of a technical advisor or special master, id.
at 26–27. Only 4 percent of pilot cases were stayed for review by the ITC
or PTO, but these stays create a statistically significant increase in case
duration. Id. at 20. Pilot cases hold 60 percent of all the Markman
hearings done in patent litigation, id. at 23, and cases with Markman
hearings have a longer duration time but are less likely to reach a
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The effect of the Patent Pilot Program on appeals was also
studied.46 Overall, the percentage of pilot cases appealed (3 percent) is
not significantly different from nonpilot cases (4 percent) in the same
districts, although there is variance between the districts.47
The study also attempted to look at whether the decisions handed
down by the Federal Circuit were of a different type—i.e., procedural
or substantive.48 More substantive decisions were handed down in pilot
cases.49 However, there was no difference between the percentage of
pilot and nonpilot cases affirmed or reversed on appeal; under two
different definitions of when the district court reached the “correct”
decision, there was no significant difference between the pilot and
nonpilot cases.50 Under the more lenient definition of correct for district
court decisions, pilot cases were affirmed by the Federal Circuit ninetyone percent of the time.51

judgment on the merits, id. at 25. Pilot cases also make up a majority of
the litigation that includes an appointment of a special master or technical
advisor, with pilot cases representing 83 percent of cases where one is
appointed. Id. at 26. Cases that have a special master or technical advisor
appointed have a significantly longer duration. Id. at 27. These case events
are unique to patent litigation, are related to an increase in the duration
of litigation, and, for two of the factors, mostly take place in the pilot
cases—yet, designated pilot judges still resolve patent litigation faster. Id.
at 23. Stays are out of the court’s control once granted. Id. at 17.
Markman hearings may only indicate a longer duration because if a
Markman hearing is held, then the case is further along in litigation. Id.
at 25. Similarly, with an appointment of a special master or technical
advisor, it is unclear if the appointment is the result of a longer, more
complicated case or is itself a cause of the increased duration. Id. at 27.
46.

Id. at 31–32.

47.

Id. at 32 & tbl.29. For example, in the three California pilot districts,
pilot cases are appealed significantly more than nonpilot cases. Id. at 32.
In considering what was driving appeals, the study looked at the case
disposition on appeal. Id. at 32–33. While pilot cases from districts that
were more likely to result in a judgment had more appeals than districts
that disposed of less cases on a judgment, the dispositions of pilot cases
for any type of disposition was not significantly different from nonpilot
cases. Id. at 33.

48.

Id. at 35. Substantive decision was defined as anything other than
“dismissed.” Id. at 36.

49.

Id. at 36.

50.

Id. Under the stricter version of correct, a case had to be affirmed and
this occurred 72 percent of the time for pilot cases; under the more lenient
version of correct, a case had to be affirmed in part and the appeal
dismissed. Id.

51.

Id. This is not a statistically significant difference from nonpilot cases,
which are correct 88 percent of the time under this definition. Id.
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The five-year report concluded by finding that the Patent Pilot
Program appears to be achieving its goal “of putting patent cases before
experienced judges, who terminate these cases faster than judges
without such patent experience.”52
C. What This Does Not Answer

The Patent Pilot Program still does not guarantee either a technical
background or technical support for designated judges. While an earlier
proposal for the program included funding for hiring technically trained
law clerks and training for designated judges,53 this did not make it into
the final version, basing the effort to build expertise solely on
experience. Some advocates for specialization see this as a problem,
arguing that judges should have technical backgrounds that match the
technology type they review.54 Charlie Stiernberg calls for the epistemic
legitimacy of judges at both the trial and appellate level to increase the
accuracy of decisions concerning the intersection of science and law.55
He points out that a judge without a technical background in a patent
case is at a serious disadvantage when preforming basic judicial
functions, like evaluating information from experts or construing a
claim from the point of view of a person having ordinary skill in the
art.56
While Stiernberg reviewed prior literature showing the reversal rate
for technically trained district court judges is higher than
52.

Id. at 39. Before concluding, the report looked at whether forum shopping
was occurring across the districts in the Patent Pilot Program by
comparing the general number of civil filings with patent filings. Id. at
36–37. A couple of districts did have a higher percentage of patent filings
than would be expected compared to all civil filings in that district, with
the Eastern District of Texas being exceptionally high. Id. at 37–38.
However, the report was done prior to TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods
Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017), and it is unknown what this
change in venue interpretation will do to the percentage of patent cases
filed in the Eastern District of Texas.

53.

Establishing a Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, H.R. 34, 110th
Cong. § l(f) (1st Sess. 2007).

54.

See, e.g., Charlie Stiernberg, Science, Patent Law, and Epistemic
Legitimacy: An Empirical Study of Technically Trained Federal Circuit
Judges, 27 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 279, 280 (2013).

55.

Id. at 281–83. He defines epistemic legitimacy as decision makers who
possess basic tools of scientific reasoning. Id. at 282.

56.

Id. at 282. The person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) is the
reasonable person of patent law; a judge must make a determination of
who is the PHOSITA in every case, based on the technology under review,
before the judge construes the claims of the patent, as the judge must
construe the claims as a PHOSITA would understand the claims. Id. at
283; see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
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nontechnically trained judges, Stiernberg points out that the small
number of technically trained federal district court judges (eight) and
the relatively few cases appealed from them (only nineteen cases with
forty-six construed claims) was insufficient to infer the effect of a
technical background.57 So, he reviewed decisions on claim construction
by the Federal Circuit, where a higher percentage of judges possess
technical backgrounds, in order to study whether those Federal Circuit
judges who have a technical background in the scientific field under
review disagree with district court claim construction more than the
nonexperts judges on the Federal Circuit.58 This finding would show
that only those judges with epistemic competency recognize all
problematic constructions, and, as such, a claim construction is not
more legitimate if reviewed by nonexpert appellate judges, even with
their experience-built expertise.59
He found that when the reviewing Federal Circuit judge has a
technical background in the same field as the patent before the panel,
that judge is 53.42 percent more likely to modify the claim construction
than a nonexpert judge.60 This indicates that the reversal rates for claim
construction may be even higher if expert judges were to review every

57.

Stiernberg, supra note 54, at 285–86. Technically trained judges were
reversed at a rate of 47.4 percent. Id. at 286.

58.

Id. at 287. Stiernberg used one hundred randomly selected cases from
April 30, 2007 to April 30, 2012, which had a total of 159 separate claim
constructions and analyzed the vote of each judge to affirm or reject the
construction, for a total sample size of 473 votes. Id. at 288–89. Nonexpert
was used to refer to those judges without technical backgrounds in the
area under review. Id. at 287.

59.

Id. at 287. Stiernberg contrasts this idea with alternative causes for the
claim construction reversal rate of 30 percent agreed upon by other
sources, like the indeterminate nature of claim construction or the Federal
Circuit’s own failure to properly articulate the law; he concludes that
there would be no difference in the claim construction reversal rates
between expert and nonexpert judges at the Federal Circuit if the
alternative causes were true. Id.

60.

Id. at 295. Stiernberg looked at several other factors in considering claim
construction reversal rates, including the experience of the Federal Circuit
judge, general experience of the district court judge, ideology differences
between the district court judge and the Federal Circuit judges according
to the party of the President who appointed them, and the experience of
the district court judge in patent law as measured by the number of patent
cases on their docket at the time they issued the claim construction. Id.
at 290–92. There was no statistical significance between the first three
factors and whether a claim construction was reversed, but he did find
that the more experienced a district court judge was according to his
metric, the less likely their claim construction was to be overturned. Id.
at 294. Stiernberg noted in his literature review that experience does
marginally improve reversal rates. Id. at 295.
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case.61 While Stiernberg notes that this does not prove the converse
hypothesis that technically trained district court judges would be
overturned at a lower rate, he believes the data raises normative
questions about the legitimacy of nontechnically trained district court
judges making mistakes that are then not caught at the appellate level
by nonexpert appellate judges.62 Overall, Stiernberg is not suggesting
that nonexpert judges can never understand technical decisions, but he
does make the point that Congress’ effort to reform the patent system
by increasing judicial experience alone, without considering adding
mechanisms to increase technical knowledge in the judiciary, is
insufficient for reducing errors in claim construction.63
In comparison, Holly Lance performed an ITC analysis that found
that ITC decisions are reversed by the Federal Circuit at a lower rate
when technical issues are considered, but at a similar rate as district
courts when nontechnical issues are considered, even though most ALJs
lack technical backgrounds.64 Looking at the last twenty-five
investigations appealed from the ITC to the Federal Circuit, Lance
found 101 separate issues.65 She divided these issues into five categories
based on how they were reviewed by the Federal Circuit: technical
claim construction issues, technical infringement/invalidity issues,
nontechnical
claim
construction
issues,
nontechnical
infringement/invalidity issues, and non-patent issues.66 Overall, she
61.

Id. at 299.

62.

Id. at 296. There is the alternative argument that this study also does not
disprove that technical expert appellate judges may overturn claim
construction more often because they are acting as “‘technocrat-kings’”
and substituting in their own preferred claim construction for that of the
district court, instead of finding more errors in the district court than
their nonexpert counterparts. Id.

63.

Id. at 297.

64.

Lance, supra note 12, at 244–45. She also analyzed whether there was a
difference in affirmance rate overall and by technical versus nontechnical
issues between those judges with technical backgrounds and those
without. Id. at 261. The results did suggest that there is a difference in
affirmance rates overall, with those judges with a technical background
preforming better, but each judge had wide variances in affirmance rate
and some have only ruled on what was considered an appealed technical
issue one time. Id. The small sample size thus makes it difficult to
conclude anything definitive about the effect of the technical backgrounds
and ALJs’ reversal rate in the Federal Circuit. Id.

65.

Id. at 253.

66.

Id. at 255. These spanned the time frame from May 2001 to April 2010.
Id. at 253. While noting that at a certain level most issues in a patent
case, especially with claim construction, are technical, she differentiated
nontechnical claim construction and infringement/invalidity issues from
the technical ones by distinguishing when “the Federal Circuit analyzed
technical aspects of the patent, such as details about how the device
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found that the Federal Circuit reviewed more nontechnical issues than
technical, and including affirmance in part, overall the ITC was
affirmed at the Federal Circuit 70.3 percent of the time.67 On technical
issues, the ITC was affirmed at an even higher rate—80.8 percent of
the time.68
This study implies that having patent experience through
specialization alone improves a trial tribunal’s result on appeal to the
Federal Circuit,69 which Steirnberg also recognize, although he
categorized this improvement as marginal.70 And, while certain features
of the ITC—like the influence of technically trained law clerks and the
Office of Unfair Import Investigations’ staff attorneys, experienced
patent litigators, are involved in the investigations—were not analyzed
but indicate that the ITC ALJs have more technical support than
district court judges, the fact that issues are more likely to be analyzed
in a nontechnical way suggests that having a technical background
should not be considered a prerequisite to ruling on patent law issues
as this would not help a judge deal with nontechnical matters.71 Instead,
Lance posits that to deal with these issues, having patent law experience
would prove more useful than having a technical background.72 In
dealing with technical issues, a judge could rely on law clerks, the
parties, or experts to educate them.73 She does not discount technical
worked, or engaged in an in-depth discussion about the prior art” as
technical; and when the Federal Circuit looked to “non-technical
techniques to make determinations, such as when it focused on
grammatical issues, turned to dictionaries or specifications for definitions”
or only needed to talk about the patent in broad terms as nontechnical.
Id. at 255–58. Non-patent issues were those appealed that do not
necessarily relate to patent law at all, like certain civil procedure issues
including standing and timing for the petition for review. Id. at 258.
67.

Id. at 259. Only 25.7 percent of the issues were technical in nature
according to her metric. Id. For claim construction, this study finds that
the ITC is reversed 26.2 percent of the time. Id. at 266. As noted
previously, this study also finds a lower reversal rate than other studies
for both the ITC and district courts for claim construction. Id. at 263–64.
On what she considered technical claim construction appeals, the ITC is
affirmed 89.5 percent of the time. Id. at 259. However, due to the small
sample size that claim construction issues make up—only 25 percent of
the issues analyzed—she cautions using it as predictor for the success of
a specialized patent program. Id. at 266.

68.

Id. at 264. This is 84.6 percent if affirmance in part is included. Id.

69.

Id. Lance cautions against using this inference to support the Patent Pilot
Program because the differing nature of the ITC and district courts. Id.

70.

Stiernberg, supra note 54, at 286.

71.

Lance, supra note 12, at 267–69.

72.

Id. at 269–70.

73.

Id. at 270.
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backgrounds as a possible consideration, since it can be beneficial in
certain instances, but she argues it is not the ultimate solution for
reforming the patent system.74
D. What the AIA Could Add

Two years into the Patent Pilot Program’s run, the AIA was
implemented.75 Relevant to this Note, the AIA added a new procedural
mechanism to patent law, inter partes review (IPR), that allows third
parties to challenge a patent’s validity before the PTO instead of in a
district court.76 In an IPR proceeding, the Patent Trial and Appeals
Board (PTAB) issues decisions on the patentability of the challenged

74.

Id. Lance does call back to the results that those ALJs with technical
backgrounds did perform better in front of the Federal Circuit, especially
when it comes to claim construction, indicating that technical
backgrounds could improve a judge’s performance. Id. Additionally, she
mentions a similar idea as Stiernberg in raising concerns about the
disadvantage a judge with no technical background has in trying to
evaluate outside experts’ reliability on a subject matter and that even
having some training in the scientific method—not even the area of study
that a particular patent concerns—could put a judge in a better position
to evaluate credibility. Id.; Stiernberg, supra note 54, at 282. Unlike
Stiernberg, who concluded that claim construction reversal rate is not due
to claim construction’s indeterminate nature, id. at 287, Lance did leave
open that possibility as an explanation for why nontechnically trained
ALJs would be overturned on nontechnical issues more than on technical
issues. Lance, supra note 12, at 267. She suggested that claim construction
is generally unpredictable and technical issues give more guidance for
construing claims, but nontechnical issues give appellate judges more
leeway in how to analyze an issue. Id. Etan Chatlynne, in raising concerns
about the futility of creating specialized trial judges to address claim
construction reversal rates because of the mixed law created by the
Federal Circuit, suggests that the indeterminate nature of claim
construction and high reversal rates on the matter are due to two different
strains in Federal Circuit jurisprudence for construing a claim. Chatlynne,
supra note 29, at 313–14. He classifies the two approaches as procedural,
where judges give the most weight to claim language, versus holistic,
where claims are interpreted in a more all-encompassing way that looks
at the claim language, patent disclosure, prosecution history, dictionaries,
and expert testimony. Id. at 314. According to the study he was reviewing,
which tracked cases decided after Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), this question was not solved by the Phillips
decision because neither doctrinal strain is about the priority of extrinsic
evidence. Id. Thus, as claim construction could be decided in two different
ways, no matter how much expertise a trial judge has, whether an
appealed case is remanded will depend on who is on the Federal Circuit
panel. Id. at 320.

75.

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011).

76.

Id. at 299.
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patent.77 The administrative patent judges (APJs) who staff the PTAB
have technical backgrounds and only oversee patent cases.78 Although
there are differences in procedure between IPRs and district court
litigation,79 these parallel systems can be used to compare how
generalist district court judges and experienced, technically trained
APJs are reviewed by the Federal Circuit.80 Gibson Dunn tracked the
77.

Id. at 303–04.

78.

Jennifer R. Bush, Administrative Patent Judges: Not Your Typical
Federal Judge, FENWICK & WEST LLP (July 10, 2014), https://www.
fenwick.com/publications/pages/administrative-patent-judges-not-yourtypical-federal-judge.aspx [https://perma.cc/73SS-XJ9D].

79.

IPR proceedings differ from district court litigation. In IPRs the PTO
applies the evidentiary standard by preponderance of the evidence and
district courts apply a clear and convincing evidentiary standard. Laura
E. Dolbow, A Distinction Without a Difference: Convergence in Claim
Construction Standards, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1071, 1706 n.22 (2017). The
PTO recently promulgated a new rule for what claim construction
standard is applied in IPRs, changing the standard from the broadest
reasonable interpretation to the Phillips standard used by district courts,
thus making the systems more similar. PTAB Issues Claim Construction
Final Rule, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/
patent-trial-and-appeal-board/procedures/ptab-issues-claim-construction
[https://perma.cc/XDL4-DDF3] (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).

80.

Federal Circuit Year in Review, Gibson Dunn, 2016/2017, at 7,
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Federal-Circuit2016-2017-Year-in-Review-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3NR-GARU] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Gibson Dunn 2016/2017]. Several
intellectual property firms do yearly reviews of the Federal Circuit, which
includes reversal rates of district court, ITC, and IPR appeals. Gibson
Dunn’s has analysis running from August 1, 2014 to July 31, 2015,
(2014/2015), when the first PTO appeals from IPRs were decided. Federal
Circuit Year in Review, Gibson Dunn, 2014/2015, at 5, https://www.
gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/FederalCircuit-2014-2015-Year-in-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWW5-2FTA]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2018). In 2014/2015, they reviewed 110 precedential
decisions, with 91 percent coming from district courts, 7 percent coming
from the PTO, and 2 percent coming from the ITC; district court appeals
were reversed 28 percent of the time (37 percent including reversed in
part), and 29 percent from the PTO were reversed (41 percent in part).
Id. at 21. From the ITC there were only two cases before the Federal
Circuit and, including reversed in part, both cases were reversed. Id.
Gibson Dunn’s analysis for 2015/2016 year reviewed 134 precedential
decisions, 66 percent from district courts, 31 percent from the PTO, 2
percent from the ITC, and 1 percent from the Court of Federal Claims;
district court appeals were reversed 33 percent of the time (39 percent in
part), the PTO was reversed in 21 percent of appealed cases (29 percent
in part), and the ITC was reversed on 25 percent of appeals. Federal
Circuit Year in Review, Gibson Dunn, 2015/2016, at 5, 26, http://www.
gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/20152016-Federal-Circuit-Year-inReview.aspx [https://perma.cc/RR9R-JD8P] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
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124 precedential decisions issued by the Federal Circuit in 2016–2017
and found that 60 percent of the decided patent cases were from district
court, 36 percent were from the PTO, 2 percent were from the ITC,
and 2 percent were from the Court of Federal Claims.81 From those
decisions, the Federal Circuit reversed the appeals from district courts
20 percent of the time (including reversed in part, it is 28 percent) and
from the PTO 31 percent of the time (including reversed in part, it is
45 percent).82 The difference in how these two methods of challenging
patents are treated by the Federal Circuit will become a good source of
data for further study, but as it currently stands, a data pool of only
three years may not be reliable as an accurate comparative measure of
reversal rates between the technically trained APJs and district court
judges.

II. Specialization’s Advantages and Disadvantages
Advocates of further specialization of district court judges argue
that the Patent Pilot Program, by focusing only on increasing
experience, does not go far enough in changing the relationship between
trial judges and patent lawsuits.83 For example, Jeff Becker advocates
expanding the reach of a patent reform bill to address the technical
proficiency of trial judges.84 Becker believes the assumption that the
current program rests on—that the additional experience designated
judges get from having cases transferred to them optionally by their
peers will create the necessary increase in efficiency and expertise in
generalist judges—is flawed, especially if Congress’ goal was to reduce
reversal rates.85 Instead, he argues that Congress should take a more
substantive step, like making wholesale changes to trial court
jurisdiction for patent law based on a hybrid of other countries’
models.86 This would result in an exclusive patent court, or at least
exclusive patent jurisdiction in select district courts with a panel of
technically proficient patent judges to whom cases are automatically
assigned.87 Further, the patent judges should be required to attend
81.

Gibson Dunn 2016/2017, supra note 80, at 26.

82.

Id. at 28. The ITC was reversed 50 percent of the time, but only had two
appealed cases. Id.

83.

Jeff Becker, On Creating Specialized Patent District Courts: Why H.R.
34 Does Not Go Far Enough to Address Reversal Rates in District Courts,
61 SMU L. Rev. 1607, 1618 (2008).

84.

Id. at 1632.

85.

Id. at 1618–19.

86.

Id. at 1622.

87.

Id. at 1623. Technical experience to Becker is equal to what the lawyers
arguing need to possess—either the guidelines promulgated by the PTO
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initial and continuing education with the Federal Judicial Center
specifically created for long-term training in patent litigation.88 And, to
address claim construction issues, trial judges should be able to request
opinions from the PTO on the validity of their claim construction—this
would give judges further access to technical expertise and experience
that would add weight to the decisions of the trial court should the
construction go up on appeal.89 Ultimately, he argues that Congress
should take jurisdiction away from generalist district court judges and
that solutions short of that are inadequate.90
However, in the American judicial system there is skepticism
around specialization generally and patent law specifically. Critics of
the Federal Circuit have emphasized its capture by specialized interest
groups and its dismissal of precedent in related law from other courts,
which is moving patent law away from the mainstream legal field.91
Some have even suggested that the Federal Circuit should lose its
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, reasoning that the Federal
Circuit’s narrow focus on patent law deprives it of the benefit of debates
in other fields of law that the other circuits have.92
Chief Judge Diane Wood of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit argues that prizing the idea of uniformity above all else in
patent law is a mistake and that the law would benefit in areas like
claim construction and obviousness, where there is debate within the
Federal Circuit itself, if different circuits could experiment with

or the requisite legal experience that patent litigators in district courts
have. Id. at 1626. However, as Becker does not see experience as conferring
expertise, at least some subset of the patent judges at a court would need
technical backgrounds. Id. Although Becker thought the most positive
aspect of the proposed program was the additional funding to hire
technically proficient law clerks, he does not think judges should have to
rely completely on technically experienced law clerks. Id. at 1626–27. And
he objected that technical proficiency for law clerks remains undefined,
which should be rectified by using the qualification the PTO sets out for
the patent bar. Id. at 1627.
88.

Id. at 1627.

89.

Id. at 1628. The PTO’s construction would not be dispositive, but Becker
thinks that the PTO’s opinion would be less likely to be reserved by the
Federal Circuit given its evidentiary value. Id.

90.

Id. at 1632.

91.

Mark A. Lemley et al., Does Familiarity Breed Contempt Among Judges
Deciding Patent Cases?, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1121, 1127 (2014). Lemley et
al. is referencing articles that argue that the Federal Circuit has been
captured by the United States government as an interest group, and thus
it favors the PTO and patent validity. Id. at 1127 n.21.

92.

Id. at 1128.
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different strains of precedent.93 However, Chief Judge Wood does not
suggest abolishing the Federal Circuit altogether. Instead, she suggests
that the appellate process for patents ought to work something like an
appeal from the National Labor Relations Board, where a litigant would
be able to appeal a decision to either the Federal Circuit, with its
experience in patent law, or to the circuit court in the region where the
complaint was originally filed.94 Chief Judge Wood notes that she finds
a more generalist judiciary advisable overall, as the law is meant to
govern society and specialists create an “arcane” ivory tower around
the law that makes it inaccessible to the public that it serves.95
A.

General Arguments for Specialization

Judicial specialization in general has several advantages and
disadvantages that should be taken into account when deciding whether
to pursue specialization in any particular field. Markus Zimmer
compiled a list of arguments in favor of specialized courts: judicial
system efficiency, legal system efficiency, uniformity, expertise,
improved case management, elimination of forum shopping, and
increased system flexibility.96
Judicial efficiency and legal efficiency are related. Judicial efficiency
is the idea that moving specialized fields from general jurisdiction courts
to specialized courts removes the need for generalist judges to work
through complicated subject matter and puts that subject matter in the
hands of those who develop expertise in that area.97 This leads to more
efficient adjudication of disputes.98 Legal system efficiency is about the
93.

Diane P. Wood, Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive
Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 Chi. Kent J. Intell. Prop. 1, 5
(2013). She argues that intercircuit debate “‘would likely give rise to a
consensus methodology (which may be an entirely new posture), add
resolution to the benefits and shortcomings of existing approaches, or
present the Supreme Court with a clearer picture of the claim construction
landscape.’” Id. (quoting Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking
Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1619, 1656–57
(2007)).

94.

Id. at 9.

95.

Id. at 7.

96.

Markus B. Zimmer, Overview of Specialized Courts, 2 INT’L J. COURT
ADMIN. 1, 1–3 (2009). Zimmer’s increased system flexibility—the idea that
with a specialized court, the number of judges can be regulated based on
boom and bust periods in litigation—and the idea of creating an
administrative agency review mechanism, id. at 3, are less relevant to
specialization in patent law, as patent litigation does not have the same
fluctuating case load Zimmer worries about and already has an
administrative review mechanism built in.

97.

Id. at 1.

98.

Id.
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lawyers who present issues to judges—lawyers do not need to spend the
time educating or developing an extensive record for a specialized judge
as may be needed with a generalist judge, leading to reduced time and
money spent on litigation.99
Several of the generalized benefits of specialization are
interconnected and relate to an overall theme of creating systematic
uniformity and efficiency. Zimmer argues that specialized courts will
lead to more uniformity in applying the law, which is supposed to make
litigation more predictable and, thus, less necessary.100 Expertise and
greater jurisdiction-specific experience that leads to higher-quality
decisions is also supposed to come from specialization, which is what
the Patent Pilot Program is trying to achieve because the judges work
in that area of law all the time.101 The increased exposure to both the
procedural intricacies and the substantive subject matter in a
specialized area of law leads to improvement in how to manage those
cases that a generalist judge does not develop.102 These features all tie
into an overall improvement to the efficiency of the system.103 Forum
shopping can also be eliminated by specialization at the trial level, as
conflicts between different jurisdictions are removed by transferring the
decision-making power to one body.104
Zimmer also produced a list of arguments in opposition to
specialization: inefficiency, judicial isolation, capture by narrowly
focused groups, due process issues, limited public access, and lower
quality of judges.105 Inefficiencies from specialization can be created
either when litigants forum shop by focusing on peripheral issues in
order to get into a different jurisdiction or are forced to litigate related
issues in separate proceedings in other jurisdictions.106 Further, judges
can become isolated by focusing on a limited set of issues.107 Working
across related legal issues is how a judge can foster and refine ideas and
99.

Id. at 1–2.

100. Id. at 2.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id. Zimmer also argues that administrative body decisions should be
reviewed by one specialized body, as opposed to several generalist bodies,
in order to prevent conflicting interpretations from issuing. Id. at 3. This
would obstruct the objectives for establishing an agency to deal with an
issue and lead to needless appeals, as well as, decrease a generalist court’s
efficiency by the adding narrowly focused and complex litigation to its
docket. Id.
105. Id. at 3–4.
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id.
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approaches for interpreting and applying the law, as well as, prevent a
judge from becoming separated from the mainstream of legal theory
and at risk for developing one-sided views that compromise
objectivity.108 The risk of compromised objectivity is also part of the
idea of capture, which is where judges of a specialized court, because
they interact with highly specialized attorneys and other interest
groups, may develop a bias towards those specialized interests.109 There
are also due process concerns created by specialization, like the
increased incentive for a narrowly specialized lobby to advocate for
appointees who agree with their points of view, compared to the
incentive to lobby for a generalist appointee who would rarely see a
case concerning a group’s issues of interest.110 Those same interests, who
frequently appear before the specialized tribunal, would also have a leg
up on litigants who are there less frequently—this compounds the
concern over capture of a specialized court.111 The level of public
accessibility can also be diminished due to the possible restrictions on
the location of the tribunal, which impose a travel burden that favors
better funded litigants.112 Zimmer also raises a concern over the quality
of the judges who would accept an appointment to a specialized court,
which can be seen as less prestigious due to the lack of need to master
more than one area of law.113
In light of these concerns, Zimmer makes several recommendations
for creating specialized courts: exercise care in selecting what areas of
law to specialize, isolate the jurisdiction, define that jurisdiction to
promote judicial interest, carefully consider the need for a specialized
court, constrain the tendency towards isolation of the appointed judges,
determine the appropriate organizational hierarchy, and make access to
the court as convenient as possible for all prospective litigants.114
Zimmer suggests that legal fields that deserve specialization are ones in
which a generalist judge is unlikely to achieve sufficient expertise
because of narrow and detailed complexity of the legal issues or factual
matters involved.115 But this area also has to be one that can be easily

108. Id. at 4.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 4–7. Zimmer also lists assessing whether or not judges should be
given life tenure when creating a specialized system, which the United
States federal court system already grants Article III judges. Id. at 5–6.
115. Id. at 4.
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separated from other areas of law and still foster sufficient litigation.116
In considering the need for a specialized court, Zimmer suggests
considering whether there is an institutional structure that could be
adjusted prior to adding a court—specifically, whether or not a federal
agency would be more equipped to resolve the issues in a less formal
way.117
Specialized tribunals should have total control over the subject
matter placed in their jurisdiction, along with authority to adjudicate
all issues involved in cases before their tribunal in order to prevent
forum shopping.118 But, the jurisdiction of the specialized tribunal
should not be so narrow as to make the cases before the court become
mechanical, leading to stagnation of the field and the judges’ legal
minds, as well as, leaving the court open to capture—Zimmer suggests
that a specialized tribunal should have jurisdiction over at least two
distinct areas of law to sufficiently widen its jurisdiction.119 Another
way Zimmer suggests preventing isolation of judges from mainstream
legal thought, other than broadening jurisdiction of the tribunal to more
than one field, is to have the judges occasionally sit on generalist
courts.120
To promote access to a new, specialized tribunal when its
jurisdiction is taken from widely distributed generalist courts, Zimmer
suggests moving the court to a central location in a populated area.121
But, he also recommends considering a roving location, so that the court
sits in different locations throughout the country to increase access to
less well-funded litigants.122 Zimmer is further concerned over the
potential reduction in a judge’s status if appointed to a specialized
court, which he believes typically has a reduced reputational status,
and thus suggests the specialized judges should have the same trappings
of office as their generalist peers, as well as, similar resources to perform
their job.123

116. Id. at 5. Zimmer singles out those areas of law based on highly technical
fact disputes that come from the scientific field.
117. Id. at 6.
118. Id. at 5.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 6. To further prevent capture, Zimmer suggests that judges of the
court sit in rotating panels. Id.
121. Id. at 7.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 6. Zimmer does distinguish between what he considers especially
important specialized courts and other, lesser categories of specialized
judges who should be set equal to generalist judge peers. Id. He points
out the Federal Circuit as an important specialized court that has the
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Zimmer considers where in the legal field’s overall hierarchy a
specialized court should be added. He suggests that specialization is
best at the trial level when the field of law deals with a complex subject
matter that requires specialized expertise, so that at the first-instance
judges have the requisite subject-matter expertise and are capable of
analyzing technical matters.124 That way the specialist judges are also
cognizant of review on appeal, making them less vulnerable to
capture.125 However, he suggests that specialization should occur at the
appellate level when the law itself is complex and the goal is to achieve
a stable and uniform body of law.126 He views as an added benefit to
specialization at the appellate level that doctrinal innovation can be
added into the field.127 The negative effects theorized to result from
specialization can thus be mitigated by careful consideration of the
court system.
B.

Arguments Against Specialization Skepticism

The theoretical skepticism towards specialization is at odds with
how the American court system works in practice. As Lawrence Baum
points out in his call for more people to run empirical studies on the
effect of judicial specialization on judges’ decision-making, it is a
misconception about how the judicial system works to think of the
American court system as one filled with generalists,128 as many judges
are already specialized in some way.129 Baum was writing in response to
studies carried out on generalist and bankruptcy judges’ decisionmaking process that found generalist judges relied heavily on intuitive
thinking as opposed to deliberative thinking, which can lead to faulty
judgement.130 The study also found that bankruptcy judges, who used
intuitive thinking too, took additional steps at other parts of the
decision-making process that disregarded considerations that detracted
from the quality of their judgments.131 This left open the possibility that

same constitutional guarantees as generalist federal judges as an example
of granting equal status. Id.
124. Id. at 6–7.
125. Id. at 7. Zimmer does consider this review to be done by a generalist
court. Id.
126. Id. at 7.
127. Id.
128. Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 Duke
L. J. 1667, 1667 (2009).
129. Id. at 1673–74.
130. Id. at 1668.
131. Id. The studies Baum is discussing also analyzed ALJs, but not in context
of their specific areas of specialization, as was done with the group of

792

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019
Specializing District Courts for Patent Litigation

specialization improves the process by which a judge makes a
decision,132 which links to the three virtues of specialization often touted
by its proponents—uniformity, expertise, and efficiency.133
While Baum allows that efficiency is a result of specialization
developed by the repetition of tasks that allows for the formation of a
routine, he views expertise as an attribute that implies a change to an
end result.134 It is generally assumed that the change to expertise creates
better quality decisions—but what is considered a better quality
decision is debatable.135 Baum raises concerns over specialization—
which might not outweigh its positive effects—noting that empirical
evidence of the effect, positive or negative, that specialization can have
on judges is lacking.136 However, Baum does note one of the exceptions
to this is specialization in patent law, as specialization at the Federal
Circuit has been studied considerably.137
C.

The Specialization Already in Place

Patent law is already one of the main areas in the American legal
system where a specialization experiment has been tried at the appellate
level through the creation of the Federal Circuit.138 While some issues
with the execution of the law by the Federal Circuit is what led to
renewed questions on how to fix the patent system, overall the court is
viewed as a success.139 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss details the specific
issues that resulted from the creation of the Federal Circuit, but she
considers any issues to be minimal and the Federal Circuit to be a
successful experiment overall.140 The solutions she offers are only
improvements to the system.141
bankruptcy judges. Id. at 1669–70. It found that the ALJ results were
comparable to the generalist judges. Id. at 1669.
132. Id. at 1668.
133. Id. at 1675. Baum does not deal with the uniformity issue, which he sees
as being borne out of fewer judges deciding issues, as opposed to changes
wrought by having particular judges focus on a narrower set of issues, the
effect of which he is discussing. Id.
134. Id. at 1676.
135. Id. For example, is it about the law being more accurately applied to the
facts of a case or about making better public policy? Id.
136. Id. at 1680.
137. Id. at 1681.
138. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment
Specialization, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 769, 770 (2004).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 800–01.
141. Id.

793

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019
Specializing District Courts for Patent Litigation

The issues she identified as coming from judicial specialization are
the Federal Circuit’s failure to describe what the law is in enough detail
to guide trial tribunals. Specifically, her concerns related to: the Federal
Circuit’s frequent use of nonprecedential decisions; the problem of
internal inconsistency between Federal Circuit panels; how the Federal
Circuit seems to disregard extra-judicial material related to empirical
social science evidence; and the levels of deference the Federal Circuit
uses to review decisions interfering with the efficiency of adjudication,
like de novo review of claim construction from district courts.142
Without drawing conclusions on whether these issues are a serious
problem for the Federal Circuit, as when it comes to answering critics
of specialized courts, even the idea that the court is not working needs
to be addressed,143 Dreyfuss offers possible solutions: open the
jurisdiction of the court to other related fields, giving it concurrent
authority with other appellate courts;144 increase the PTO’s law-making
authority to increase the level of deference the Federal Circuit awards
it; require greater use of the designation practice of the judges on the
Federal Circuit to increase the array of experience Federal Circuit
panelists get; fill vacancies on the court by elevating appointees from

142. Id. at 773–85. Dreyfuss also raises the general concern related to
specialization that the Federal Circuit would lack external consistency
with other tribunals in other areas of law. Id. at 778. Dreyfuss identifies
some empirical evidence to go with these claims, but in other places
supports the issues only with anecdotal evidence. Id. at 769. To discuss
the output of nonprecedential decisions, internal inconsistency, and
external inconsistency she frames the issues with data from William M.
Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts
of Appeals Judges, 27 J. Legal Stud. 271 (1998). Dreyfuss, supra note
138, at 774 n.17, 776 n.25, 779 n.37. However, for looking at how the
Federal Circuit is impacted by extra-judicial material she notes that such
a study does not exist but uses Craig Nard’s Toward a Curious Approach
to Obeisance: The Role of Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law
Jurisprudence, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 667 (2002), which counts the number
of secondary sources cited by the Federal Circuit and compares it to the
number of secondary sources cited by the Ninth Circuit in cases
concerning trademark and copyright law. Dreyfuss, supra note 138, at 781
n.43. To discuss the issues with the process the Federal Circuit uses to
review decisions, Dreyfuss relies on anecdotal evidence concerning the
problems that arise from differing level of deference and scrutiny. Id. at
784–86.
143. Dreyfuss, supra note 138, at 800–01.
144. Id. at 786. In discussing other areas of law that could be added to the
Federal Circuit’s docket, Dreyfuss also discusses choice of law rules that
would bind the court to both procedural and substantive laws of other
jurisdictions, which would force the court to grapple with mainstream law.
Id. at 788–91.
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elsewhere on the federal bench to gain insight on innovation law and
how trials work;145 and change venue laws.146
In discussing her proposed changes to venue, Dreyfuss identifies
where most of the other issues with the Federal Circuit come from—
mistakes in the institutional design implemented by Congress that
created a specialized system to increase judicial expertise at the
appellate level while technical issues in patent law arise as factual
considerations at the trial level.147 As such, specialization at the
appellate level seems to waste the substantive technical expertise that
it is meant to foster; Dreyfuss points out that Congress may have been
better served to create a specialized trial court for patent law in the
first place.148 She considers that something like a specialized trial court
should still be added to the system, but if this dual specialization would
remove patent law too far from the mainstream, she suggests changing
venue laws so that only one court in a circuit or certain judges in specific
districts hear patent cases.149
D.

What Commentators Have Suggested

As indicated by the various authors, while the creation of a
specialized appeals court for patent law has generally proven to be a
success, the lack of specialization at the trial level wastes many of the
benefits that go along with a specialized legal field and that are
particularly relevant to patent law. When looking at the patent system
specifically, several commentators have made suggestions to fix trial
level adjudication.
Dreyfuss starts by suggesting a wholesale change to create a
specialized trial court as well as other reforms.150 These alternative ideas
include giving courts of general jurisdiction power over specialized areas
of law—this looks like designating one court in each circuit with patent
jurisdiction, thus concentrating patent jurisdiction in twelve courts that
could each develop an expertise in patent law while still maintaining
145. Id. at 797.
146. Id. at 797–800.
147. Id. at 797.
148. Id. at 797–98.
149. Id. at 798–99. In another article written prior to the implementation of
the Patent Pilot Program, Dreyfuss notes that even if this suggestion
seems to be a step too far, the relationship between the Federal Circuit
and the district courts could be repaired by reconsidering the standard of
deference applied in appellate review. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search
of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 787, 806 (2008) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, In Search of
Institutional Identity].
150. Dreyfuss, supra note 138, at 798.
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generalist status.151Within these twelve courts, she also suggests
choosing only one or a small group of judges on the court to hear patent
cases.152 This would further concentrate jurisdiction in a few judges to
build expertise, as well as, build an interchange of ideas with the
Federal Circuit that Dreyfuss views as conducive to improving the
administration of the law.153
Stiernberg, who raised the idea that without proper technical
backgrounds in the judiciary technical decisions may not be legitimate,
does not go as far in his suggestions for reform.154 He sees a specialized
trial court made up of judges with all the requisite scientific
backgrounds to hear any case that comes before the court as
impractical.155 He does suggest that a specialized trial court with
nonexpert judges who rely on expert support, similar to several
European models, could overcome the system’s current deficiencies.156
He also lists several other less drastic ways to support the judiciary on
technical matters, like obtaining PTO opinions on claim construction,
requiring patents to be drafted in normal language, allowing for
interlocutory appeals on claim construction, or awarding more deference

151. Id. at 798–99.
152. Id. at 799.
153. Id. at 800. The latter suggestion would not be much more of a step from
what the Patent Pilot Program already creates, other than the voluntary
nature of the current program. To achieve Dreyfuss’ suggested result, the
designated districts could acquire exclusive patent jurisdiction among trial
courts, and then the designated judges on each court could gain exclusive
jurisdiction over cases filed, instead of relying on the cases to be
voluntarily transferred. Id. at 799. Indeed, Dreyfuss points out that, even
in 2004, prior to the institution of the pilot program, her suggestion is
really just a tweak of existing venue laws and matches what litigants
already try to do. Id. Patent cases were not brought uniformly across the
country but in a few select districts that hear the majority of cases and
judges within those districts seemingly have acquired expertise out of it.
Id. at 799–800 (citing Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent
Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 889,
903–4, 908–16 (2001)). The district courts would not be as regionally
diverse as Dreyfuss’ suggestion to pull one court from each circuit. This
would also leave out the patent heavy jurisdiction of Delaware. But, it
would have the added benefit that these jurisdictions volunteered in the
first place, thus evidencing the desire to seek out patent litigation overall.
This may be the easiest step to take in creating patent exclusive
jurisdictions among trial courts, considering what Congress has already
taken steps to do.
154. Stiernberg, supra note 54, at 297.
155. Id. at 297–98.
156. Id. at 297.
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to district court decisions.157 He notes that the earlier bill for the Patent
Pilot Program that provided funds for technically trained law clerks or
further judicial education would have helped address the lack of
expertise, and sees providing education for judges as another possible
step towards addressing epistemic legitimacy issues.158
Allison Orr Larsen provides two alternatives to increasing expertise
at the trial court level.159 Building on the idea that the technological
revolution is providing another way to supply information and that the
Supreme Court already uses amicus briefs, although sometime of
questionable reliability, she suggests a clearinghouse-type institution
outside the adversarial process for amicus briefs that would supply
outside expertise with more accuracy and objectivity.160 She specifically
cites the British court system’s use of a nonprofit organization,
P.R.I.M.E. Finance, to help nonspecialized judges with highly
complicated financial cases after the 2008 crisis. The organization
“maintains a database of relevant publications and routinely provides
technical training, support, and a ready pool of expert witnesses for the
courts” to act as a “‘one-stop access [point] to the best collective
knowledge of law and market practice regarding derivatives and other
complex financial products’” that channels expertise to judges from
outside the adversarial set up of the courts.161 As an alternative, Larson
also suggests the possibility of quasi-specializing district court judges
but in a different model from the Patent Pilot Program.162 Also drawing
from the United Kingdom reforms for handling complex financial cases,
she suggests forming a pool of district court judges with prior patent
experience who could already be considered experts in the field and
then allowing parties in litigation to jointly elect to select from this list
of judges to oversee a trial.163 These judges can then be continually
157. Id. at 299. Whether any of these last three actually answer Stiernberg’s
complaint or are just reforms that are suggested by others is unclear. Id.
158. Id. at 298.
159. Allison Orr Larsen, Judicial Fact-Finding in an Age of Rapid Change:
Creative Reforms from Abroad, 130 Harv. L. Rev. F. 316, 317 (2017).
160. Id. at 317, 319–20.
161. Id. at 318–19 (quoting Gerard J. Meijer & Camilla M.L. Perera-de Wit,
P.R.I.M.E. Finance: A New Dispute Resolution Facility for Conflicts
Relating to Complex Financial Products, 14 Bus. L. Int’l 153, 157
(2013)).
162. Id. at 320.
163. Id. at 321. In 2015, the government of the United Kingdom formed a list
of twelve judges who had dealt with “‘financial claims of £50 million or
more, or cases that raise issues concerning the domestic and international
financial markets.’” Id. at 320–21 (quoting History, Cts. & Tribunals
Judiciary, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-the-judiciary/going-tocourt/high-court/financial-list/history/ [https://perma.cc/CUR2-PWLE]
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educated on the ins and outs of patent law, further developing their
expertise in the specialized area without giving up their generalist
status.164
Judge James F. Holderman of the Northern District of Illinois
acknowledges that patent cases are more fit for the specialized judge to
hear than the generalist one, noting that the suggestion to create a
specialist within a generalist is not enough, and instead advocates for a
specialized patent court.165 However, he suggests not the creation of a
new court, but instead endorses the idea of expanding the jurisdiction
of the U.S. Court of International Trade to hear all patent trial cases,
at least concurrently with district courts.166 He reasons that the Court
of International Trade is an Article III court; has nationwide
jurisdiction; is already subject to review by the Federal Circuit; sits all
over the country; and would have higher exposure to patent litigation,
allowing its judges to develop expertise while also maintaining their
docket in international trade law.167
E.

Effects to Consider

There are some possible effects of specialization to consider.
Lawrence Baum proposes several effects, both positive and negative,
that specialization can have on judges.168 As discussed above, the results
of the study Baum analyzed found a change in the decision-making
(last visited Mar. 15, 2018)). Parties jointly ask for their cases to be heard
by a judge off of the list and the Chancellor of the High Court and the
Judge in Charge of the Commercial Court then appoint one to the case.
Id. at 321. From there, the normal appellate process applies. Id. The
judges elected to the list were then given continual education in this
specialized area. Id. For patent litigation here, this list could include those
top fifteen judges from Shartzer’s study.
164. Id. at 321. This is supported by Shartzer’s work showing that the fifteen
district court judges who have seen the most patent cases have developed
expertise between them and the Federal Circuit that results in their cases
being overturned less. Shartzer, supra note 10, at 231. As Larson notes,
when “a judge gets up to speed on complex technical issues like these, it
seems a shame to just let that knowledge go to waste.” Larson, supra note
159, at 321.
165. James F. Holderman, Judicial Patent Specialization: A View from the
Trial Bench, 2002 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 425, 43031 (2002). He
specifically lists the ideas of appointing expert judges, designating a single
judge in each district court to hear all patent cases, using more special
masters to construe patent claims, and using educated juries with
technical qualifications as suggestions that do not go far enough in
reforming the patent litigation system. Id. at 430.
166. Id. at 431.
167. Id.
168. Baum, supra note 128, at 1667.
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process of specialized bankruptcy judges that correlated with improved
positive effects on correcting intuitive decision-making.169 However, the
concerns over specialization he raises are somewhat different from those
repeated elsewhere: assertiveness, insularity, and stereotyping.170
Insularity, which he associates with the idea that the court is more open
to capture by interest groups because of its narrow purview, is a
common theme in the debate over specialization.171 But, he also raises
the ideas of assertiveness, where judges who view themselves as experts
are less likely to be deferential to both administrative bodies or superior
courts filled with generalist judges, as well as, stereotyping, where
judges repeatedly hearing certain fact patterns will simply treat current
cases like past cases.172
Mark A. Lemley, Su Li, and Jennifer M. Urban additionally found
a less reported side effect of specialization that relates particularly to
patent law when the authors performed a study to test the result of
patent experience among judges based on something other than reversal
rate.173 The authors sought to answer the question of how specialization
affects a judge’s decision-making process in ruling on a case and found
that specialization appears to impact the substance of decisions.174
Across all districts, judges, technology areas, and time studied, judges
who hear more patent cases are less likely to find a patent infringed.175
The number of patent cases a judge hears does not have a statistically
significant relationship to rulings about invalidity.176 The authors
speculate that the finding is not due to an overall increase in confidence
on the part of judges with more patent experience—indeed, the increase
in finding noninfringement with increased patent experience occurs
quickly, with a judge needing to hear less than 0.2 prior patent cases
per year177—as the judges do not become any more likely to second-

169. Id. at 1668.
170. Id. at 1677.
171. Id. at 1677–78.
172. Id. While Baum initially categorizes these three possible effects as
negative, he does go on to note that effects of judicial assertiveness and
influence groups could improve public policy. Id. at 1680.
173. Lemley et al., supra note 91, at 1124–25.
174. Id. at 1124.
175. Id. at 1151. The authors particularly highlight this finding, as it is the
one that holds across variables studied. Id. at 1155.
176. Id. at 1140.
177. Id. at 1143, 1143 fig.2. The authors note that this would amount to less
than one patent ruling over a three-year period, with an 8 percent increase
in likelihood of finding noninfringement taking place by the 0.2 prior
patent case per year mark before leveling off. Id.
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guess the PTO on findings of validity.178 Instead, the authors posit that
judges who see more patent cases are more likely to find that patentees
overclaim their patent rights.179 Alternatively, it could be that finding
noninfringement is easier than holding a patent invalid because it is less
likely to require a trial or be overturned by the Federal Circuit.180 While
both of those suggestions are merely speculation, the results do show
that specialization of judges through experience—even relatively little
experience—has an unintended substantive effect on judicial
decisions.181

III. Recommendations
A.

What Should Be Considered

Lemley, Li, and Urban used their finding that increased exposure
to patent litigation had a significant affect on the substances of rulings
to raise the question of what is a “good” result for specialization.182 If
one of the proposed benefits of specialization is that it should improve
the quality of decisions, Chief Judge Wood, Dreyfuss, Stiernberg, and
Baum all ask what are better-quality decisions in patent law? And, how
is that measured? Claim construction reversal rates have become a
metric for this, but is it the right one?
Shartzer’s study found that district court judges with the most
appeals to the Federal Circuit are reversed less, indicating that
experience at least teaches the judges to find what the Federal Circuit
believes to be better answers.183 But Stiernberg raises the question of
whether it is really better decision-making when a nontechnically
trained district court judge makes a mistake that a nonexpert appellate
court judge does not catch.184 Baum notes two alternative meanings of
the right decision: (1) properly applying facts to law, which is what
Stiernberg argues may not be possible without technical expertise, or
(2) making the best decision for public policy.185 Chief Judge Wood
agrees with Dreyfuss’s broader idea that the “correct decision” by the
Federal Circuit is law that is “‘responsive to the philosophy of the
Patent Act, to national competition policies, and to the needs of
178. Id. at 1151.
179. Id. The authors note that this same logic is also supported by the fact
that a patent troll is less likely to win in district court. Id. at 1151–52.
180. Id. at 1152.
181. Id. at 1146–47.
182. Id. at 1152.
183. Shartzer, supra note 10, at 231.
184. Stiernberg, supra note 54, at 299.
185. Baum, supra note 128, at 1676.
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researchers and technology users.’”186 But to talk about quality of
decisions, Chief Judge Wood refers to the more narrow congressional
belief that specialization will lead to better decisions.187
Empirical quality metrics remain imperfect measurements. When
discussing specialization through the lens of improved decision quality,
one first needs to define what is meant by quality, how it is measured,
and the assumptions made for that assessment. For example, for the
Patent Pilot Program to use claim construction reversal rates to
determine whether judges make the right decision assumes that the
Federal Circuit reaches the correct result. In searches for metrics to
determine the effects of isolation, experiments indicate specialization
does have an affect on the decision-making process of the judge188 and
the substantive ruling.189 But, whether either of those experiments show
a result of better decision-making is another matter—and, as Lemley,
Li, and Urban point out, the answer a person gives will probably depend
on how they are affected by the trend in the substantive change.190
It needs to be recognized that the stated objectives for improvement
that will result from specialization need to be reoriented. Claim
construction is not an accurate measuring tool for the idea of correct
decisions. The accuracy of decisions in applying facts to law and the
idea of precision that encompasses less reversal and more certainty
should be addressed, but when trying to analyze accuracy and
186. Wood, supra note 93, at 3 (quoting Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional
Identity, supra note 149, at 796). Dreyfuss notes that the continuing issue
with the Federal Circuit revolves around the idea that their decisions are
not accurate, in that the court is “simply not considering whether the law
is developing in a manner that reflects policies that meet the needs of the
creative sector and further federal interests in promoting technological
progress,” or is weighing accuracy against precision and deciding to stick
with predictability. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity, supra
note 149, at 800.
187. Wood, supra note 93, at 3. Dreyfuss breaks better down into four different
forms. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity, supra note 149, at
796. In creating the Federal Circuit, Congress focused on the ideas of
precision (that decisions would be replicable, leading to more
predictability) and uniformity, which Dreyfuss believes the court has
mostly achieved. Id. However, this may have come at the expense of the
other two forms: accuracy, as in a decision in line with public policy; and
quality, which depends on “law that is cohesive in that the elements work
together to further overall policies, and decisions that are explicated in a
manner that makes the policy goals the court understands the law to be
achieving both transparent and persuasive.” Id.
188. Baum, supra note 128, at 1667, 1681.
189. Lemley et al., supra note 91, at 1151.
190. Id. at 1152. The authors do not make a judgement call on whether this
makes decisions more correct, they just note the change in behavior by
the judiciary. Id. at 1155. Neither does Baum, supra note 128, at 1684.
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precession, substantive areas of patent law apart from claim
construction need to be considered. Plus, there are other features to
prioritize when building a litigation system. The focus should thus be
shifted to a more expansive review of what would be considered a
success if improved upon. This focus of whether specialization is
achieving its goals should change to include adjustments that can be
measured—like improvements to judicial efficiency that reduces time
and cost of litigation, as well as, an attempt to combat forum shopping.
B.

What Patent Tribunals Should Look Like Going Forward

Multiple authors noted that the Patent Pilot Program seems to be
an extension of what was already going on in patent litigation, with
certain districts and then certain judges within those districts hearing
a higher percentage of the patent cases filed.191 But as Becker argues,
the Patent Pilot Program does not go far enough.192 Instead of using a
band-aid on the court structure that was already formed, Congress
should act to create a patent law court system that builds a structure
that matches the benefits the data collected on specialization support.
This includes the recognition that the benefit of specialization in a
technical field with complicated, fact-specific litigation occurs at the
trial level.
The trial court system should be structured so that patent litigation
has its own court. Placing all patent litigation in one court will reduce
the forum shopping phenomenon that plagues several districts in the
current system.193 However, since placing the court in only one place
may strain accessibility for some parties, Congress could consider
making it a roving court, so that it could go to the litigants instead of
the litigants having to go to it. The number of judges on the court
would not need to be fixed but could vary to match the docket load of
the jurisdiction. Removing patent cases, known to be long and complex,
will lighten the dockets of other district courts, which could prove
especially helpful in places like the Eastern District of Texas, the
District of Delaware, and the districts in California.
Creating a singular court with exclusive jurisdiction over all district
court patent litigation194 will also still line up with the assumption
Congress already adopted—that more experience handling patent cases
will have beneficial results. While the research above shows that
whether those results produce better decisions is ambiguous, the
research does show that judges with more experience become more
191. See Lemley et al., supra note 91, at 1134; see also Dreyfuss, supra note
138, at 799–800.
192. Becker, supra note 83, at 1608–09.
193. See id. at 1628–30.
194. The issue concerning split jurisdiction between the PTO and district
courts on the issue of validity is beyond the scope of this Note.
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efficient in handling patent litigation. Having a specialized court with
judges who only work on patent cases will allow those judges to become
more familiar with the procedural intricacies of patent law and perfect
how to manage cases, decreasing litigation time and costs. Further,
experience dealing with the Federal Circuit does seem to implicate a
reduction in reversal rates, which could become the rule for all trial
judges on a singular patent trial court instead of applicable to only
those top fifteen judges scattered across the country who currently hear
the most patent cases.195 In addition to giving the court exclusive
jurisdiction over patent trials, the court should also have jurisdiction
over the other issues in the case, similar to the Federal Circuit, so that
the benefits of expedited litigation time is not negated because parties
need to argue non-patent issues related to the same facts in a different
forum.
As for the judges who preside in this new trial court, the benefit of
requiring technical backgrounds does not outweigh the burden of
reducing the pool of qualified judges who could be appointed to the
court. At most, those judges who are appointed should be able to pass
the patent bar as required of the lawyers in the field. That does not
mean that those judges need the same perquisite education that the
lawyers need to sit for the patent bar. The judges just need to pass the
test, which is not based on substantive scientific material but is a test
on the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure that practitioners follow
to prepare and prosecute patents.
Those judges also need specific resources allotted to them once they
are appointed to the court. The judges should have the funds to hire
technically trained law clerks that can sit for the patent bar. This
supplies the judges with technical support that is not coming from an
adversarial perspective. Further, the rules of the court should encourage
the use of resources already in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
allow judges to appoint third-party experts for those cases that, at the
judge’s discretion, require a level of expertise beyond what the judge
and clerks can handle. In fact, the clearing house mechanism discussed
above in the British court system for complex financial cases could be
195. The finding by Shartzer on this point is interesting, as the reduction in
reversal rates between the most proficient judges in patent litigation
indicates that those trial judges learn what the Federal Circuit will accept
with repeated cases brought before it. If this were the trial judges just
getting to the Federal Circuit’s correct answer then the reversal rate
would presumably be more panel dependent, especially in those areas
where the Federal Circuit has different strains of case law. This byplay
between repeat trial judges and Federal Circuit could be increasing the
trust between the Federal Circuit ‘technocrats’ and the trial court judges.
Thus, moving all litigation into the realm of trial judges who are
considered experts and who would deal with the Federal Circuit on a
regular basis could increase deference to trial court decisions more than
an actual change in standards of review that appellate judges can write
around would.
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warranted, even with the current mechanism to pull in court appointed
experts. Such a clearinghouse could be organized by the ABA or PTO
as a third-party arbiter that coagulates expertise across every scientific
field and niche areas of study to readily supply judges with a trustable
source for scientific background that judges can use as another form of
technical support. In addition to funds or other structural mechanisms
for technical support, the setup of the new trial court should require
that the appointed judges take part in regular continued education that
is tailored to patent litigation.

Conclusion
When the Patent Pilot Program’s ten-year trial period expires in
2021, Congress should not extend the current program. Instead,
Congress should take more drastic steps to create real change in the
patent trial system that address current identifiable and fixable
problems. This includes creating a separate trial court for patent
litigation with specialized judges appointed to it and supplying those
judges with the necessary resources to compensate for any lack of
technical experience, like funding for technically trained law clerks and
mandatory continuing education on patent litigation for the judges.
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